Prepared by the researche : Amr Rashad Ismail – Expert in African Affairs
DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH
Since its independence from France in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire has never witnessed a peaceful transfer of power. As the Ivorian presidential elections scheduled for October and November 2025 approach, serious concerns have emerged about the possible recurrence of electoral violence, following President Alassane Ouattara’s announcement of his candidacy for a fourth presidential term—despite his earlier declaration that he would not run again, on the condition that former president Laurent Gbagbo would also abstain.
Fears of electoral violence have increased after the politicization of the judiciary and court rulings aimed at excluding the strongest opposition candidates from the presidential race. Additional restrictive measures, such as banning student unions’ activities, have further limited the opposition’s capacity to compete. Within this tense atmosphere, it becomes crucial to monitor and analyze the pre-election dynamics in Côte d’Ivoire in order to anticipate the possible trajectories of the electoral process—an endeavor this paper undertakes through the following axes:
History of Violence and Non-Peaceful Power Transitions
The political evolution of Côte d’Ivoire reveals a legacy of authoritarian culture among its political elites, beginning with its first president Félix Houphouët-Boigny and continuing with his successors. This legacy has entrenched a culture of political and electoral violence among the government, the opposition, and the general public alike.
At the onset of democratization and multi-party politics in the early 1990s, the Ivorian elite failed to embrace the country’s political diversity, which led to the rise of subnational identities and deepened ethnic polarization and intolerance. This environment ushered the country into a cycle of political and electoral violence, sparking two civil wars: the first in 2002, at the beginning of Gbagbo’s presidency—triggered by ethnic divisions and the marginalization of northern Muslims; and the second in 2011, at the end of his rule, after Ouattara’s electoral victory, which Gbagbo refused to recognize, plunging the nation into chaos.
Although Ouattara’s popularity improved after he succeeded in steering the economy to relative safety, electoral violence accompanied his election for a third term in 2020, when the opposition argued that the constitution allowed only two presidential terms. Ouattara and his allies, however, justified his third-term bid by citing a Constitutional Council interpretation which stated that the 2016 constitutional amendment reset the term limits, allowing him to run again. The election was marred by widespread violence, leaving thousands dead or injured.
In a surprising turn, as the 2025 elections near, Ouattara once again announced his candidacy for a fourth term, despite his previous promise not to run again—raising fears of a new wave of violence.
Triggers of Political and Electoral Violence
President *Ouattara* and his government have adopted a set of policies to secure an easy electoral victory with minimal opposition. However, these same measures could drive the opposition toward *violent confrontation*, risking a slide into civil war. The main triggers include:
Ouattara’s Run for a Fourth Term Contrary to His Promises
In 2020, President Ouattara publicly stated he would not seek another term, tying that commitment to former president *Gbagbo’s* withdrawal. Yet, as the 2025 elections approach—and despite Gbagbo’s exclusion from the candidate lists—Ouattara reversed his position, declaring:
There are exceptional circumstances the country is going through that compel us to continue leading.”
He justified his decision by citing *unprecedented security, economic, and financial challenges* requiring experienced leadership, adding:
Duty sometimes surpasses promises made in good faith… After deep reflection on the country’s interests, I reconsidered my earlier commitment not to run. I am a candidate because the Constitution allows it and because I am in good health to continue serving my nation.”
This announcement infuriated the opposition, which called on its supporters to demonstrate. Massive protests erupted in *Abidjan on August 9, 2025, rejecting the fourth term bid and demanding a **review of the electoral rolls* and the reinstatement of excluded opposition leaders. In response, the *Independent Electoral Commission (CEI)* stated that revising the rolls was “impossible,” as the process would take seven months, while the election date was constitutionally fixed.
. Politicization of the Judiciary
Observers believe the Ouattara government has *politicized judicial rulings* to sideline opponents, particularly *Tidjane Thiam, the main opposition figure. The court disqualified Thiam from the elections, claiming he **lost his Ivorian nationality* by acquiring *French citizenship in 1987*, under the nationality law from the 1960s, which stipulates in Article 48 that obtaining another nationality revokes Ivorian citizenship—except in cases of dual nationality by birth.
Although Thiam provided proof that he was *French by birth* and had *renounced French citizenship in March 2025*, the court ignored the evidence and upheld his disqualification.
Political Exclusion: Elections Without a Strong Opposition
Following Thiam’s politically motivated disqualification, the *Independent Electoral Commission* also excluded three major opposition leaders:
Laurent Gbagbo, former president;
Charles Blé Goudé*, former youth minister under Gbagbo and popularly known as “the Street General”; and
Guillaume Soro*, former prime minister under Gbagbo and later speaker of parliament under Ouattara.
The commission based its decision on prior *criminal convictions*, which legally bar them from running for public office.
Hopes rested on the *Constitutional Council, responsible for reviewing CEI decisions, but it disappointed the opposition by approving only **five candidates*:
- Incumbent president *Alassane Ouattara*
- Simone Jean Ehivet*
- Henriette Lagou Adjoua* (a 2015 presidential candidate)
- Jean-Louis Billon*, former minister of trade and candidate of the “Democratic Conference” coalition of eight parties
- Ahoua Don Mello*, an activist from Gbagbo’s party, who self-declared as a backup candidate
The Council rejected *55 other applications*, including those of the “big four”—Gbagbo, Thiam, Soro, and Blé Goudé.
Crackdown on the Opposition
To tighten its grip, the government launched a *wave of arrests* targeting opposition figures. Following violent incidents in *Abidjan in early August 2025, dozens of opposition supporters were detained. The public prosecutor charged nine members of **Gbagbo’s African Peoples’ Party (PPA-CI)* with *conspiracy against state authority, **participation in rebellion, **intentional destruction, and **arson*. Two prominent politicians were also charged:
Former defense minister *Lida Kouassi Moïse*
Retired diplomat *Koné Boubacar*
Intensifying Competition Through Electoral Alliances
The ruling party, *Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (RHDP), seems determined to retain power at all costs. Meanwhile, the fragmented opposition has started forming **coalitions* to challenge it.
In *March 2025, a coalition of **25 political parties* announced the creation of the *“Alliance for Peaceful Alternation in Côte d’Ivoire.”* Later, in *June 2025, the two main opposition parties—Gbagbo’s PPA-CI* and *Thiam’s Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI-RDA)—formed the *“Common Front,”** focusing on opposing Ouattara’s fourth term bid, reinstating excluded candidates, auditing electoral rolls, and reforming the CEI to ensure fairness.
Persistence of Subnational Loyalties
More than two decades after the two brief civil wars, *ethnic and regional divisions* still threaten to resurface. There are current allegations that *Ouattara* is favoring the *northern Muslim-majority* regions at the expense of the *southern Christian-majority, reversing the pattern of marginalization that existed under **Gbagbo* and earlier southern-led governments. The tense political climate since Ouattara’s third term provides fertile ground for *domestic or external actors* to exploit *ethnic loyalties* and reignite conflict.
Economic Growth and Stability
President *Ouattara* is widely recognized as one of Africa’s top economists. Having served in the *IMF, the **Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), and later as **IMF’s Director for Africa, he returned to BCEAO as **Governor* before entering Ivorian politics.
Under his leadership, despite global and regional challenges, *Côte d’Ivoire’s economy* maintained an average annual growth rate of *around 5%, with projections of **6% for 2025. This growth has raised **real per capita income* to over *$2,700, representing an **80% increase* from pre-Ouattara levels. Such economic success strongly influences *voter attitudes* and public sentiment.
Rising Political Popularity of Ouattara
Despite political conflicts with predecessors who sought to exclude him from power, *Ouattara* demonstrated *notable personal magnanimity* toward them. Seeking *national reconciliation, he issued **presidential pardons* for convicted opponents involved in the 2010–2011 post-election crisis, including *former president Gbagbo, his ex-wife Simone Ehivet*, and several ministers and security officials.
He even invited both *Gbagbo* and *former president Henri Konan Bédié* to return and participate in national independence celebrations. Such gestures enhanced Ouattara’s image as a *reconciliatory and statesmanlike leader*, increasing his popularity.
Ensuring Electoral Integrity
Election observers from the *African Union (AU)* and the *Forum of West African Elders, supported by **ECOWAS, reported that Ouattara and his government **pledged to ensure free and transparent elections*.
After independent pre-election visits meeting with government, CEI, opposition, and civil society representatives, observers commended the *ongoing preparations* and expressed optimism about the process. Analysts believe the government will strive to *improve its international image* by delivering a relatively credible election—especially since the outcome appears *largely predetermined*.
Possible Scenarios for the 2025 Ivorian Elections
Based on the preceding analysis and lessons from past electoral experiences, the 2025 elections in Côte d’Ivoire are likely to follow one of three scenarios:
Scenario 1: Widespread Violence or Civil War*
Given the entrenched *culture of violence* among Ivorian elites and the *closure of democratic avenues* for regime change, the opposition might resort to violence to *disrupt the electoral process* and pressure Ouattara’s regime to *rerun elections* with reinstated candidates. However, this scenario is *unlikely*, as no opposition faction appears capable of bearing the burden or consequences of triggering a new civil war.
Scenario 2: Peaceful Acceptance of the Status Quo*
The opposition may reluctantly *accept the electoral outcome* to avoid national chaos, focusing instead on *future elections* and forming stronger coalitions. This scenario is also *less likely, given the opposition’s **fragmentation*, despite ongoing coalition efforts.
Scenario 3: Limited Protests and Controlled Violence (Most Likely)*
This scenario envisions *protests rejecting the results, followed by **localized clashes* met with state repression. Regional mediators—particularly from *ECOWAS and the AU—would then intervene to calm tensions. The outcome might involve **a partial power-sharing arrangement, with Ouattara offering **ministerial posts* to opposition figures.
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