Organization of Governing Management  Within the Constitutional Frameworks of Complex Policies

Prepared by the researche : Dr. Safia Zivingi (Prof. h.c)   –   Review: Prof. Dr. Rafik Sulaiman – College of Applied Interdisciplinary LTD – London- United Kingdom

DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH

International Journal of Kurdish Studies : Twelfth Issue – January 2026

A Periodical International Journal published by the “Democratic Arab Center” Germany – Berlin

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Abstract

This paper proposes a novel constitutional model that transcends the traditional dichotomy between federation and confederation. The prevailing scholarly debate often juxtaposes the stability and integration of federations against the flexibility and autonomy of confederations, leaving a theoretical gap for systems that require a more nuanced approach to sovereignty and power-sharing. This research addresses this gap by developing an integrative framework designed for deeply diverse or post-conflict political entities. The core of the argument centers on redefining the concept of sovereignty as “shared” or “common,” established through a foundational document that blends the rigidity of a constitution with the flexibility of a treaty. This model innovatively regulates the right to secession by framing it not as an absolute right (ius secessionis) but as a conditional, legally-circumscribed mechanism of last resort, thereby balancing the integrity of the union with the self-determination of its constituent units. Furthermore, the paper elaborates on the administrative and legislative structures necessary to operationalize this framework. It examines the distribution of powers—exclusive, concurrent, and residual—across different government levels, advocating for a principle of subsidiarity in public service provision that ensures minimum national standards while respecting local specificities. The analysis also covers the relationship between executive and legislative institutions and the complexities of external representation in a non-hierarchical polity. Ultimately, this study contributes to the field of comparative federalism by offering a structured, yet adaptable, model for achieving sustainable governance in contexts where homogeneity and centralization are neither feasible nor desirable. This research seeks to develop a new, integrated model, combining the positive elements of both federal and confederal systems, and addressing the problems inherent in some of their components. The aim is to overcome stagnation, complexities, vulnerabilities, and other obstacles. The research does not delve deeply into the details of describing existing models, as its objective, within this limited scope, is to focus on the most prominent problems and obstacles, highlighting the positive aspects of each element in each issue within these two systems. The ultimate goal is to propose moderate solutions that satisfy the broadest segment of society and respect rights, while avoiding models that lead to complications, stagnation, paralysis, and other problems associated with federal and confederal systems. Furthermore, the research boldly addresses one of the most complex dilemmas: the issue of sovereignty and secession. It presents proposals within its flexible methodology, outlining the conditions for accepting secession within moderate parameters that respect the rights and obligations of all parties and minimize harm.[1]

Kute

Ev gotar modelek destûrî ya nû pêşniyar dike ku ji dubendiya kevneşopî ya di navbera federasyon û konfederasyonê de derbas dibe. Nîqaşa akademîk a serdest pir caran aramî û entegrasyona federasyonan li hember nermbûn û xweseriya konfederasyonan dide ber hev, û ji bo pergalên ku nêzîkatiyek nuwazetir ji bo serwerî û parvekirina desthilatdariyê hewce dikin valahiyek teorîk dihêle. Ev lêkolîn vê valahiyê bi pêşxistina çarçoveyek entegrasyonê ya ku ji bo saziyên siyasî yên pir cihêreng an piştî pevçûnê hatî çêkirin çareser dike. Bingeha argumanê li ser ji nû ve pênasekirina têgeha serweriyê wekî “parvekirî” an “hevpar” e, ku bi rêya belgeyek bingehîn a ku hişkbûna destûrek bi nermbûna peymanek re tevlihev dike hatî damezrandin. Ev model bi rengek nûjen mafê veqetandinê bi çarçovekirina wê ne wekî mafek mutleq (ius secessionis) lê wekî mekanîzmayek şertî, yasayî ya çareya dawîn rêk dixe, bi vî rengî yekparebûna yekîtiyê bi xwebirêvebirina yekîneyên wê yên pêkhatî re hevseng dike. Wekî din, gotar li ser avahiyên îdarî û qanûnî yên ku ji bo xebitandina vê çarçoveyê hewce ne, berfireh dike. Ew belavkirina desthilatan – yên taybet, hevdem û yên mayî – li seranserê astên cuda yên hikûmetê vedikole, û prensîba alîkarbûnê di dabînkirina xizmeta giştî de ku pîvanên neteweyî yên herî kêm misoger dike û di heman demê de rêz li taybetmendiyên herêmî digire, diparêze. Analîz her weha têkiliya di navbera saziyên rêveber û yasadanînê û tevliheviyên nûnertiya derveyî di siyasetek ne-hîyerarşîk de vedihewîne. Di dawiyê de, ev lêkolîn bi pêşkêşkirina modelek avahîkirî, lê adapteyî, ji bo bidestxistina rêveberiyek domdar di çarçoveyên ku homojenî û navendîbûn ne gengaz in û ne jî xwestî ne, beşdarî qada federalîzma berawirdî dibe. Ev lêkolîn hewl dide ku modelek nû û yekgirtî pêş bixe, hêmanên erênî yên her du pergalên federal û konfederal bi hev re bike yek, û pirsgirêkên ku di hin pêkhateyên wan de hene çareser bike. Armanc ew e ku li ser sekinandin, tevlihevî, qelsî û astengiyên din were derbas kirin. Lêkolîn bi kûrahî naçe nav hûrguliyên danasîna modelên heyî, ji ber ku armanca wê, di vê çarçoveya sînorkirî de, ew e ku li ser pirsgirêk û astengiyên herî berbiçav bisekine, aliyên erênî yên her hêmanê di her pirsgirêkê de di nav van her du pergalan de ronî bike. Armanca dawîn ew e ku çareseriyên nerm werin pêşniyarkirin ku piraniya civakê têr bikin û rêz li mafan bigirin, di heman demê de ji modelên ku dibin sedema tevliheviyan, bêçalakbûnê, felcbûnê û pirsgirêkên din ên bi pergalên federal û konfederal ve girêdayî dûr bikevin. Wekî din, lêkolîn bi cesaret yek ji dilemayên herî tevlihev çareser dike: mijara serwerî û veqetandinê. Ew di nav rêbaza xwe ya nerm de pêşniyaran pêşkêş dike, şertên ji bo qebûlkirina veqetandinê di nav parametreyên nerm de destnîşan dike ku rêz li maf û erkên hemî aliyan digirin û zirarê kêm dikin.

The Nature of the Founding Document: Between Rigid Constitutions and Flexible Treaties

The constitutional and foundational contrasts between federalism and confederalism are starkly reflected in the legal nature of their founding documents and the resulting locus of ultimate authority within the integrated political structure.

The essential difference in political unity stems from the very foundation upon which the association is established. A confederation is traditionally formed through an international treaty or pact, defined by one eighteenth-century source as a “league” or “alliance” (Johnson, 1792). The Articles of Confederation in the early United States, for instance, were considered less a constitution and more a “mutual defense treaty” between newly independent, co-equal states. Because this form of union is based on a treaty between fully sovereign parties, modification of the foundational document typically requires the unanimous consent of the member statesز For example, attempts to amend the U.S. Articles of Confederation to grant Congress the power to levy an impost failed because they required the unanimous approval of all thirteen state legislatures (Klarman, 2016, 17; Maggs, 2017, 407; Ratification, 2013, 10).

Conversely, a federation is structurally founded upon a supreme, entrenched, written constitution. This structure transforms the founding document from a contractual pact between independent sovereigns into a body of fundamental law that operates directly upon the individual citizens of the new entity (Rosenthal & Joseph, 2015, 41). The durability of this union is ensured because the authority and existence of each tier of government are constitutionally guaranteed. Consequently, fundamental constitutional revisions in a federation are deliberately rigid, requiring elaborate processes involving special majorities in the federal legislature or, as in the Swiss model, a double majority (consent of both the federal population and a majority of the constituent states), thereby preventing unilateral amendment by any single level of government (Watts, 2008, 163; Maier, 2011, 4).

The Problem of Sovereignty: Towards the Concept of “Shared” or “Common” Sovereignty

The contrast in founding documents dictates the fundamental difference in the location and exercise of ultimate authority. In a confederation, the constituent states remain the holders of supreme power (sovereignty). The confederate center is merely a legal creation endowed with delegated authority from the sovereign member units (Petrović, 2016, 2; Malinverni, 1994, 41). Because the union cannot create a state will higher than that of its members, the central government usually lacks the power to enact effective sanctions or compel obedience directly from citizens, relying instead on the elusive premise of member states adhering voluntarily to its resolutions. This inherent dependence meant that legislation operated only upon the states in their “corporate or collective capacities,” a principle Alexander Hamilton deemed the “great and radical vice” of confederal structures .

In sharp contrast, a federation involves the integration or division of sovereignty between the central authority and the constituent units. Sovereignty is understood to be constitutionally divided and non-centralized. The component units (federal entities) forfeit their international legal personality in favor of the overall federal structure, making the federal state the sole international entity (Malinverni, 1994, 39; Petrović, 2016, 20). The federation exercises authority directly upon individual citizens, unlike the passive structure of a confederation, by establishing two distinct governments—the central and the regional—that are co-equal and derive their powers directly from the supreme constitution. This ensures that neither government is constitutionally subordinate to the other (Watts, 2008, 10).

The defining difference between federalism (federal states) and confederalism (unions of states) lies in the fundamental allocation and location of ultimate authority, particularly through the lens of sovereignty.

In a confederation, the constituent member states retain their full and independent sovereignty. The component units are considered the sole “holders of supreme power” and retain their international legal personality. Consequently, the central confederate authority is merely a legal creation exercising only delegated power provided by the sovereign member units (Petrović, 2016, 2; Malinverni, 1994, 41). This arrangement inherently results in a weak central power that is subsidiary to the founding states. Crucially, the central body lacks the legal means to compel obedience directly from individuals; instead, its resolutions operate upon the states exclusively in their “corporate or collective capacities. This reliance on states as intermediaries—rather than acting directly upon citizens—is identified as the “great and radical vice” of confederal systems (Hamilton, 1788, 108). Fundamentally, the confederal structure cannot create a legal will superior to that of the member states (Sall & Lo, 2020, 153), reinforcing the principle that authority at the center is residual and lacks true coercive power.

In sharp contrast, a federation fundamentally alters this structure by integrating or dividing sovereignty. Sovereignty is deemed non-centralized and constitutionally shared between the central governing authority and the constituent political units. This division means that neither the federal center nor the constituent units is subordinate to the other; both orders of government derive their authority directly and separately from the supreme constitution (Watts, 2008, 10; Maier, 2011, 5). The federal government extends its legislative authority directly to the persons of the citizens, distinguishing it completely from the corporate-level legislation characteristic of a confederation. Furthermore, the act of forming a federal state requires the formerly sovereign entities to integrate their sovereignty into the new structure. As a result, the constituent communities are not sovereign states from the perspective of international law; only the federal state itself is considered the sole international entity (Malinverni, 1994, 4107; Petrović, 2016, 20). This constitutional integration establishes coordinate and autonomous orders of government that govern the same territory and population (Sulaiman, 2025,3-11).

The relationship between federalism and confederalism regarding the capacity for constituent units to legally withdraw reflects a fundamental divergence in the nature and permanence of their respective political unions. This divergence hinges on the foundational locus of sovereignty and the subsequent legal characterization of the union—as a perpetual entity in federalism, or as a voluntary association in confederalism.

Confederalism and the Right to Secession (Ius Secessionis)

In a confederation, the constituent states are explicitly recognized as sovereign political units that maintain their independence, a status which is preserved by the foundational international pact or treaty. This retention of supreme authority translates directly into the legal right for member states to leave the union, often termed the ius secessionis ( Maier, 2011, 3). Since the central authority operates merely on delegated powers, deriving its legitimacy from the constituent units rather than directly from the citizenry, this delegation is generally revocable (Sall & Lo, 2020, 153; Petrović, 2016, 2). The structure is designed specifically to ensure the autonomy of the constituent units over building a strong central authority. Consequently, the Confederate Unio is inherently dissoluble; the federation can dissolve if the states decide to become independent, This legal fluidity means that a member state generally has the legal possibility of leaving the Confederation whenever it wishes. This vulnerability to withdrawal often contributes to the observed transitory and unstable nature of historical confederal systems (Watts, 2008, 187; Kenzhehanovna & Talantuly, 2012, Abstract).

Federalism and Indissolubility: The General Prohibition

By contrast, the federal state is structurally predicated on the principle that the union is perpetual and indissoluble. This permanence is a direct result of the integration of sovereignty into the overall federal entity, leaving the constituent units without ultimate sovereign power (Petrović, 2016, 20; Malinverni, 1994, 39). Unilateral secession is therefore viewed as fundamentally incompatible with the cohesive nature of the federation. The early history of the United States illustrates this commitment: the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the Union, declared perpetual by the Articles of Confederation, was only made “more perfect” by the Constitution. As federal constitutions rarely include explicit provisions for withdrawal (Watts, 2008, 186), any attempt at unilateral secession constitutes an extra-constitutional action, often resulting in conflict (Watts, 2008, 186;). The aim of the federal structure is the formation of a single, coherent decision-procedure that the constituent territorial units cannot negate independently (King, 1982, 112- 116).

Federalism and Conditional Secession: The Integral Framework

While the default position of federalism prohibits unilateral secession, contemporary federal practice has developed conditional frameworks for managing profound internal disagreements, framing separation as a conditional final guarantee rather than an inherent right. This mechanism ensures that the political reality of deep division can be addressed while preserving the rule of law and the constitutional framework. For instance, the constitution of St. Kitts and Nevis permits secession under specified conditional arrangements (Watts, 2008, 128). In a significant legal development, the Canadian Supreme Court acknowledged that while Quebec does not hold a unilateral right to leave the federation, the rest of Canada would have a constitutional duty to negotiate the terms of separation if the decision were supported by a clear democratic majority voting on a clear question, This approach constitutionalizes a process for managing dissolution by requiring compliance with fundamental federal principles, including democracy and the rule of law (Buchanan, 2003, 246–47). This recourse to a rigorous, heavily conditioned, negotiated process stands in deliberate opposition to the nature of withdrawal in a confederation, where the member states, by virtue of retaining their sovereignty, possess a presumptive and automatic right to withdraw (Petrović, 2016, 1; Sall & Lo, 2020, 153).

The Positive Aspects of the Constitutional and Political Structure

Federalism and confederalism represent distinct yet related attempts to institutionalize political unity across multiple jurisdictions, differing fundamentally in the permanence of the union, the location of sovereignty, and the legal mechanism establishing the polity. While federalism aims to forge an integrated state capable of decisive centralized action, confederalism prioritizes the autonomy and independence of its constituent members. Both models offer unique benefits tailored to specific historical and political requirements, making each appropriate depending on the governing context.

The Nature of the Founding Document: Between Rigid Constitutions and Flexible Treaties

A core distinction lies in the legal status and rigidity of the foundational text. A confederation is typically established through an international treaty or pact, often viewed less as a constitution and more as a mutual defense agreement between co-equal sovereign states. The foundational strength of the confederal model is its inherent flexibility and elasticity. Since it is contractual, modification requires, generally, the unanimous consent of the member states, which safeguards the sovereignty and equality of the constituent members against unwanted centralizing pressures (Aubert, 1994, 33-44; Sall & Lo, 2020, 153). Historically, this treaty-based structure proved sufficient to achieve complex goals, such as leading a successful war effort and securing favorable international treaties, as evidenced by the United States Articles of Confederation (Maggs, 2017, 414).

By contrast, a federation is constructed upon a supreme, entrenched, written constitution. The fundamental benefit of the federal model’s rigid constitutional basis is the guarantee of the authority and existence of each tier of government (Watts, 2008, 157). The constitutional framework transforms the founding document from a mere pact among independent entities into a definitive body of fundamental law operating directly on citizens (Rosenthal & Joseph, 2015, 41). This deliberate rigidity ensures the long-term stability and political viability of the union. Amendments are typically complex, requiring special legislative majorities or a double majority (Watts, 2008, 163; Maier, 2011, 4). This rigorous process preserves the basic structure, enabling long-term planning and investment.

The Locus of Sovereignty and Political Capacity

The allocation of supreme authority is the defining functional difference between the two systems. In a confederation, the member states explicitly retain their sovereignty, freedom, and independence. The central government functions only through delegated powers and is considered weak and subsidiary to the founding states (Petrović, 2016, 2; El Tom, 2009, 263; Malinverni, 1994, 41). The principal benefit of this retained sovereignty structure is the maximal realization of unit or particularistic interests, and the protection of the political autonomy of constituent units from encroachment. The inability of the confederal center to compel obedience directly from citizens was historically considered a major vice , but it ensures that the central authority cannot impose a will superior to that of the member states (Sall & Lo, 2020, 153).

In a federation, sovereignty is understood to be constitutionally divided and ultimately vested in the federation itself, not exclusively in the member units. This mechanism of integration is considered highly advantageous because it grants the federal government the requisite energy and power to enact laws and collect revenue directly from citizens, providing for the “common defense” and regulating a cohesive “economic union”. The constitutional division of power serves as a system of checks and balances, mitigating the “potential tyranny of the majority” while maximizing opportunities for democratic representation (Watts, 2007, 192). This dispersal of power enables the central government to focus effectively on core national issues, such as security and foreign affairs, while promoting efficiency and flexibility in addressing policy challenges through shared responsibility.

The Question of Dissolution: Guaranteeing Stability and Choice

The legal status of a constituent unit’s ability to terminate the relationship underscores the distinctive commitments of these two systems. In a confederation, the member states generally maintain the legal right to secede (ius secessionis), or, in other words, the possibility of withdrawal is inherent unless explicitly forbidden by the pact. The positive aspect of retaining this power of exit is that it reassures sovereign states, who are highly sensitive to their rights, from entering an arrangement that might lead to their complete dissolution or subordination, making the union fundamentally voluntary (Aubert, 1994, 3347; Forsyth, 1994, 42). The existence of this right is seen as guaranteeing the continued autonomy of the members.

Conversely, a federation is built on the premise that the union is perpetual and indissoluble, and unilateral secession is incompatible with the constitutional integration of sovereignty. The central benefit of this doctrine of indissolubility is the guaranteed long-term security and continuity of the constitutional state. While unilateral secession is barred, some modern federal systems provide the benefit of a conditional framework for negotiated withdrawal, recognizing the political necessity of addressing profound and persistent conflict, thereby legitimizing a process that might otherwise lead to outright conflict (Watts, 2008, 18, 128; Buchanan, 2003, 239).

So, Federalism and confederalism offer fundamentally distinct models for balancing unity and autonomy. Federalism achieves its strengths through a rigid constitution and the integration of sovereignty, creating an energetic and perpetual national state capable of commanding resources and providing security and stability. Confederalism secures its value through the flexibility of a treaty and the retention of full state sovereignty, preserving the independence and integrity of its members by maintaining a minimal and mutually dependent central authority (Maggs, 2017, 407; El Tom, 2009, 263). The choice between these models often reflects whether the primary necessity is maximizing central authority for common defense and economic viability (federalism) or rigorously defending the separate identity and political autonomy of the constituent units (confederalism) .

Fundamental Structural and Political Vulnerabilities

Federalism and confederalism, though both mechanisms for uniting geographically disparate populations, possess inherent structural and operational flaws that often define their political trajectories and contribute to their ultimate stability or failure. An examination of their respective disadvantages reveals contrasting vulnerabilities stemming from the centralization or dispersal of power.

The most acute drawbacks of confederalism are rooted in its fundamental lack of coercive power and intrinsic political instability, rendering it institutionally feeble. A confederal system typically lacks a central government capable of enacting decisions that are authoritatively binding for the system as a whole. The central government is only deemed to exercise delegated authority and cannot compel obedience from its sovereign member states. This absence of sanction means that the central government’s pronouncements often amount to mere recommendations, which states may choose to observe or disregard at their option. The system is characterized by the core flaw identified as the principle of “legislation for States or Governments, in their corporate or collective capacities”, a fundamental structural weakness that required entirely new institutional architecture to resolve in the American case. Furthermore, the organizational structure often lacked crucial components, such as a separate executive branch and an independent judiciary, leading to institutional “imbecility” and inefficiency. Politically, the requirement for unanimous consent among states for constitutional amendments created an impasse that prevented necessary reform, demonstrating a major political shortcoming (Morton, 2005, I; Klarman, 2016, I; Rakove, 1987, I; Hamilton, 2003, 140). This intrinsic political weakness meant that the union was vulnerable to external threats, as internal “weakness and divisions” invited dangers from abroad.

By contrast, the disadvantages of federalism arise primarily from the complexity inherent in coordinating divided jurisdiction and the potential for political conflict perpetuation. The federal system imposes extensive requirements for consultation, participation, and bargaining among multiple elected officials across tiers of government, adding significant organizational complexity to policymaking. This diffusion of authority often weakens the control federal officials have over implementing national policy, forcing reliance on autonomous, sometimes “reluctant partners” (Stoker, 2010, I; Kincaid, 2001, I). This structural division may institutionalize the perpetuation of internal divisions and conflict, rather than stabilizing them. For marginalized groups, the federal system’s multiplicity of political venues can reinforce existing stratification, as the system becomes exceedingly difficult for poorly resourced populations to navigate. Furthermore, due to the structure of representation in the federal system, a structural bias can emerge that favors rural over urban voters, creating an “urban disadvantage” in national lawmaking. In some cases, the dominance of a single political party at both central and subnational levels can inhibit federal success, as observed in South Africa where this party dominance served as a functional impediment (Hueglin & Fenna, 2015, I; Watts, 2008, 183).

Operational Failures and Economic Instability

The primary historical failures of confederal systems were fiscal and economic, resulting from the member states’ overwhelming reluctance to relinquish financial control. The lack of federal authority to levy taxes directly led to constant financial crises and an inability to pay essential expenses or service war debts. The system of funding the central treasury through voluntary state requisitions proved fundamentally flawed; rational states employed a “free-rider” logic, withholding contributions and pursuing self-interest at the expense of the common good, eventually leading to meager national resources. This fiscal collapse led to the federal treasury being bankrupt and unable to secure loans from foreign powers or its own citizens. Economically, the lack of power to impose uniform commercial regulations led to destructive competition, as states enacted tariffs and trade barriers against one another, hindering interstate commerce and economic prosperity. The fiscal crisis was further characterized by high inflation and worthless currency, destabilizing the value of money and making it impossible for the army to purchase necessary supplies (Kaplanoff, 2000, I).

For federal systems, major economic and financial difficulties frequently center on fiscal imbalances that complicate the operation of the common market and compromise the accountability of lower-tier governments. A high degree of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI) is a pervasive drawback, occurring because constituent units have expenditure responsibilities exceeding the revenue capacity allocated to them, necessitating reliance on the federal government for grants and financial transfers. This VFI fundamentally obscures the link between the benefits of local public expenditures and the level of taxes levied to finance them, undermining fiscal responsibility in subnational authorities. Similarly, Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance results from disparities in tax-raising capacity among regions, leading to unequal service provision or inequitable tax burdens for comparable levels of public services across different constituent units. These financial mechanisms sometimes create moral hazard problems, whereby states engage in fiscal indiscipline or overspending because they expect a central government bailout, often encouraged by the design of risk-sharing mechanisms. Moreover, the autonomy granted to states creates the persistent risk of destructive tax competition, where jurisdictions compete for mobile tax bases (like businesses or high-income individuals) by offering inefficient tax policies, thereby distorting capital flows and detracting from overall economic efficiency (Inman & Rubinfeld, 2014, Abstract; Ter-Minassian, 1997, 8; Inman & Rubinfeld, 2014, I).

In summary, the fundamental weakness of confederalism resides in its constitutional design, which guarantees its collapse by failing to furnish the central authority with the necessary coercive and fiscal tools to survive, ultimately resulting in anarchy or dissolution. Federalism, conversely, is constitutionally designed for endurance, yet its enduring complexity generates endemic challenges related to fiscal accountability, the tendency toward centralization through federal spending authority, and the inherent difficulty in coordinating the political efforts of independent yet interdependent governmental spheres.

Hybrid solutions:

The comparison between confederalism and federalism reveals them as opposed structures regarding the centralization of power, yet historical and theoretical analysis suggests that overcoming the fundamental deficiencies of both often necessitates an integration of their characteristics into hybrid models that seek optimal governance.

Foundational Documents and the Path to Institutional Flexibility

A critical divergence lies in the foundational document and the resultant capacity for institutional adaptation. A confederation is legally rooted in a flexible international treaty or pact among sovereign member states. The chief disadvantage inherent in this legal framework is the typical requirement for unanimous consent to effect constitutional alterations ( Lo, 2020, 153). This feature practically guarantees legislative impasse and renders the union incapable of responding effectively to internal crises or external pressures, leading to political breakdown.

Conversely, a federation is structured around a rigid, supreme written constitution. While this rigidity provides necessary stability and permanence, a primary drawback is the complexity and slow pace of reform. The path toward integration requires resolving this tension between paralyzing flexibility (confederalism) and paralyzing rigidity (federalism).

The solution involves adopting the constitutional framework of federalism while building in mechanisms for managed flexibility. This is achieved by moving away from the confederal principle of unanimity toward special majority requirements or double majority provisions for constitutional amendments. Furthermore, many federations utilize extrinsic devices for adjustment, such as intergovernmental collaboration and judicial interpretation, to adapt the basic constitutional structure without resorting to the arduous formal amendment process. This blend transfers the founding legal authority from a potentially dissoluble pact between sovereigns to a stable, binding fundamental law while maintaining procedural avenues for adjustment.

Sovereignty, Coercive Authority, and Fiscal Integration

The core operational weakness of a confederation is the lack of effective central authority and coercive power. Since member states retain sovereignty, the central government is merely a legal creation operating on delegated authority. This structural defect, famously termed the “great and radical vice”, leads inevitably to fiscal collapse because the center cannot levy taxes and relies on voluntary, and often withheld, requisitions from states (Klarman, 2016, I; Dougherty, 2000, I).

In the federal model, sovereignty is conceptually integrated, granting the central government direct coercive authority over individual citizens. However, this shared authority often leads to organizational complexity and coordination failures when implementing shared programs, forcing reliance on autonomous, sometimes “reluctant partners. Economically, the complexity frequently generates Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI), where subnational spending needs exceed their revenue-raising capacity, compromising local accountability (Ter-Minassian, 1997, 8).

Integration requires granting the center the necessary fiscal authority (the federal strength) to address national problems while structuring that power to ensure accountability and efficiency (the federal solution). This transition involves establishing an integrated financial system where the federal government possesses the unambiguous power to tax and raise revenue directly.

To mitigate the internal fiscal pathologies characteristic of complex federations (like VFI and resulting inefficiencies in resource allocation), hybrid designs must utilize sophisticated intergovernmental transfers. These mechanisms, typically enshrined in the constitution, ensure horizontal equity (addressing disparities in regional wealth) and vertical fiscal balance. By mandating clear transfers based on objective criteria rather than short-term political maneuvering, governments promote fiscal responsibility and coherence by aligning the responsibility for spending with sufficient funding capacity (Paul Bernd Spahn & Wolfgang Fottinger, 1996, 245). This approach transforms the decentralized nature of state administration (a strength of confederal systems) into an organized reality backed by stable, centrally managed revenue.

Stability, Permanence, and the Conditional Guarantee of Exit

The fundamental tension regarding the duration of the political union rests on the confederal assumption of retained state sovereignty, which includes the legal right to secede (ius secessionis). This right guarantees the instability and eventual dissolution of the union. Conversely, the federal model is premised on the perpetual and indissoluble nature of the state (Watts, 2008, 168). While providing stability, this rigidity means that secessionist pressures, when they arise, lead to extra-constitutional conflict and potential civil war.

The integrated approach acknowledges the reality that deep-seated conflicts based on identity and regional divergence may persist even within a stable federal structure. Thus, the solution is not to deny the possibility of separation outright, but to frame it as a strictly conditional political process—a conditional last guarantee.

This integration involves adopting the federal principle of perpetuity while providing a legal framework for negotiated withdrawal under exceptional circumstances, removing the instability of a unilateral right while bypassing the inevitability of conflict. For example, complex constitutional rulings require that secession must be addressed through negotiation contingent upon adherence to principles like democracy and the rule of law, protecting both the will of the local majority and the rights of the rest of the federal population (Buchanan, 2003, 239). This compromise transforms the right of exit from a source of confederal fragility into a carefully managed democratic procedure for resolving existential federal conflicts.

• Governance structure and distribution of powers:

The fundamental divergence in administrative structure between federalism and confederalism is most clearly observed in their degrees of centralization, the locus of bureaucratic power, and the resultant institutional capabilities for effective governance and service delivery.

Degree of Centralization and Decentralization

The administrative structure of a confederation is inherently defined by extreme decentralization, a condition guaranteed by the founding states’ retention of full sovereignty. In this model, political unity is an association of independent countries, and the central authority is merely a league or pact among sovereign states. The administrative power, particularly in the critical areas of taxation and coercive authority, remains with the member states. The center’s operational scope is therefore residual and severely curtailed, lacking the necessary coercive power to compel obedience directly from individual citizens or compliance from the member states themselves. For example, under the U.S. Articles of Confederation, the central government lacked the power to collect taxes directly and was thus unable to enforce its resolutions effectively (Maggs, 2017, 408). Consequently, the primary administrative responsibility rests exclusively with the sovereign constituent units.

In sharp contrast, federalism establishes a structure of constitutionally divided and shared power, necessitating a strong central government with genuine administrative capacity. While the core principle of federalism is decentralization—the sharing of centralized power and responsibility among provinces and local levels – the system’s strength lies in guaranteeing both the central and constituent units a constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy. This administrative division is often dualistic, meaning each level delivers programs in its own area of responsibility using its own departments. However, contemporary federal practice increasingly involves the integrated or interlocking model, where the constituent units administer programs or laws centrally legislated. For instance, in Germany, the legislative function is centralized, but implementation and administrative responsibilities are extensively decentralized to the Länder (Spahn & Pottinger, 1997, 227; Watts, 2008, 88). This cooperative approach facilitates uniformity in essential policy areas while maintaining local control over service delivery. Nepal, reflecting a modern trend, has established a three-tiered government (federal, provincial, and local) explicitly designed to counteract centralized governance and ensure effective service delivery at the local level.

Bureaucracy and its Levels

The nature of the bureaucracy within a confederation reflects its inherently weak structure. The central confederal government historically lacked a separate executive branch. The functions of a central executive were instead performed by the single legislative body, creating an organizational deficiency and inefficiency often described as “imbecility”. For example, the Confederation Congress had to handle executive decisions itself, such as military command orders. Consequently, the confederal center could not create a robust central bureaucracy, relying instead on the administrative apparatus of the member states. When Congress did create a Committee of the States to operate during recess, it comprised only a single delegate from each state, underscoring the limited nature of the central administrative capacity (Maggs, 2017, 407).

In contrast, the federal bureaucracy is structured across multiple, coordinated tiers, reflecting the system’s complexity and functional requirements. Modern federal systems universally establish three organs of state: executive, legislature, and judiciary, ensuring a permanent and institutionalized federal administration. Federations often operate with a multi-tiered administrative structure encompassing federal, state (provincial), and local levels.

The efficiency of this bureaucracy is often debated. Some political scientists contend that the multiplication of local bureaucracies in a decentralized system can lead to a loss of macroeconomic control, as monitoring becomes problematic. This complex arrangement generally necessitates extensive consultation, participation, and bargaining among multiple elected officials and public servants, often complicating the policy-making process (Kincaid, 2001, I; Watts, 2008, 18).

However, decentralizing administration also offers distinct advantages, particularly at the local level, which often forms the foundation of the federal system. Local governments are empowered to provide services directly to the populace in a government closer to the people that can enhance democratic participation and responsiveness. For example, local government bureaucracy in Nepal (the third tier of the system) is responsible for the provision of essential services like healthcare, education, and irrigation management. This focus on local capacity ensures administrative mechanisms are adaptable to local needs and cultural preferences, a goal central to the successful rollout of federal structures (BUKU 2025, 141).

Provision of Public Services: Between Minimum National Standards and Local Specificities

The comparison between federalism and confederalism regarding the provision of public services fundamentally reflects their contrasting priorities concerning the role of the central authority: uniformity and macroeconomic effectiveness in the former, versus maximal local autonomy and self-determination in the latter. This difference is particularly visible when balancing the imposition of minimum national standards against the recognition of local specificities.

The distribution of power in a confederation places paramount emphasis on the maximal realization of unit or particularistic interests. Since the founding document is a pact between sovereign states, the constituent members retain their freedom and independence. The confederal center’s weakness means it lacks the power to enforce its policy decisions directly upon individual citizens or command obedience from the member states. Therefore, the capacity for the central authority to establish and enforce minimum national standards for public services is severely limited, often resulting in fragmentation and reliance on non-binding recommendations. Furthermore, the member states are the primary decision-makers regarding social and financial management within their territories. The absence of a central coercive power inevitably generates fiscal and economic weaknesses, particularly the inability to enforce uniform commercial regulations or collect reliable revenue, which ultimately hampers the consistent provision of public goods across the territory (Kaplanoff, 2000, I; Feinberg, 2002, I).

In a federation, the structural design prioritizes coordinately autonomous orders of government, but the overall system possesses the necessary energy to enact laws that operate directly upon individuals. This structure facilitates the creation and maintenance of minimum national standards across key public services, thereby mitigating sharp regional disparities that can result in political instability (Watts, 2008, 114; Maier, 2011, 14).

The mechanism for balancing national uniformity with regional needs manifests primarily through the distribution of legislative and administrative functions:

1. Constitutional Guarantee of Standards: The federal framework often incorporates explicit commitments to equalization or uniform standards, establishing a national interest in equitable service provision. For example, the Constitution of Canada commits the federal and provincial governments to providing “reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation”. Similarly, Germany’s Basic Law strives for “uniformity of living conditions” across the nation (Spahn & Pottinger, 1997, 227; Watts, 2008, 108).
2. Recognition of Local Specificities (Administrative Decentralization): Although national minimum standards are established, the implementation and administration of public services often remain highly decentralized to accommodate local specificities, political cultures, and differing service demands. In many European federations, like Germany and Switzerland, legislative jurisdiction is centralized, but the constituent units (states or cantons) are constitutionally responsible for administering these federal laws. This institutional separation allows regional governments to structure their service delivery, such as education and health care, in accordance with their “particular needs”. Furthermore, services like local policing, sanitation, and fire prevention are typically assigned to the municipal or county level (Ter-Minassian, 1997, 6; Watts, 2008, 100).
3. Local Governance Focus: The federal model often empowers the lowest tier of government (local or municipal) with constitutional legitimacy to handle daily services, thereby ensuring the government is “closer to the people” and capable of responding directly to local concerns . This local governance structure is a key feature, as seen in Nepal, where local bodies are explicitly given the power to implement policies related to development, quality service delivery, education, and infrastructure based on local needs.

Thus, while the confederal structure preserves local specificity by implicitly granting maximal autonomy and lacking central coercive power, this comes at the expense of national coherence and stability. The federal structure, through its combination of constitutional supremacy and administrative decentralization, successfully imposes minimum national standards, ensuring universal access and equity while allowing the flexibility for local governments to meet the specific demands of their populations.

• Distribution of Powers · Exclusive, Shared, and Residual Powers.

The distribution of powers between confederalism (union of states) and federalism (federal state) reveals fundamental differences concerning the scope of central authority, the level of centralization, and the ultimate location of ultimate legal authority.

Distribution of Powers: Exclusive Powers

The assignment of exclusive powers clearly reflects the foundational principles of sovereignty governing each system. In a confederation, the central authority operates only on delegated authority conferred by the sovereign member states. Consequently, the authority granted to the central body is highly specific and inherently weak. For instance, the Confederation Congress under the Articles of Confederation was granted sole power, exclusive of the states, to declare war, make treaties, and send and receive ambassadors (Maggs, 2017, 327). However, the central government lacked coercive powers; notably, it had no authority to impose taxes directly or regulate commerce.

In sharp contrast, a federation constitutionally integrates power between the tiers, allowing the federal government to act directly on the persons of the citizens. The federal government is assigned exclusive powers intended to maintain national unity and economic viability. These typically include the power to print paper money, coin currency, raise an army, declare war, and set foreign policy. For example, Nepal’s Union List includes exclusive powers over defense, currency, banking, and federal planning. Conversely, the constituent units in a federation also hold explicitly defined exclusive powers, such as primary responsibility for providing public schooling and education, local police forces, and managing zoning and land use approvals.

Distribution of Powers: Shared/Concurrent Powers

The approach to managing overlapping jurisdictions provides a further distinction between the two forms of government. In the confederal model, the preservation of state sovereignty meant avoiding substantial concurrent jurisdiction, relying instead on the voluntary concurrence of the member states for coordinated action.

In a federation, the existence of concurrent (shared) legislative power is commonplace and structurally accommodated. This allows both the federal government and the constituent units to legislate simultaneously within the same domains, such as education, forests, trade unions, social security, and economic planning . To ensure the coherence of law in these interwoven areas, federal systems usually mandate that in cases where federal law conflicts with constituent unit law, the federal law will prevail.

• Distribution of Powers: Residual Powers

The assignment of residual authority—jurisdiction over matters not specifically addressed in the foundational documents—is handled in an opposed manner. In a confederation, the residual authority is retained entirely by the member states, emphasizing the limited and derivative nature of the central body. The U.S. Articles of Confederation explicitly stated that each state retained its sovereignty and every power, jurisdiction, and right not “expressly delegated” to Congress. In a federation, the assignment of residual power depends on the process by which the entity was initially formed. In systems created through the aggregation of previously independent units (like the United States and Switzerland), the residual powers typically remain with the constituent states. This practice is formalized in the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which reserves powers not delegated to the federal government to the states or the people. Conversely, in holding-together federations established through the devolution of power from a unitary system (like Canada and India), the residual powers are generally retained by the central federal government.

The relationship between executive and legislative institutions:

The relationship between the executive and legislative branches constitutes a crucial point of divergence between federalism and confederalism, reflecting the fundamental structure of authority, decision-making capacity, and the principle of separation of powers within each political system.

Confederalism: Legislative Dominance and Executive Absence

A defining characteristic of the early confederate model was the notable absence of a separate executive branch of government. Consequently, the central authority was typically concentrated in a single legislative body, such as the Continental Congress under the United States Articles of Confederation. This meant that the legislative body was compelled to execute decisions itself. For instance, the Confederation Congress frequently had to consider resolutions concerning military movements or diplomatic appointments, functionally taking on executive roles.

This legislative dominance did not necessarily imply unified strength. The centralization of all functions—legislative, executive, and judicial—in the Congress of the Confederation was criticized as being ineffective and suffering from “imbecility”. Although the central body sometimes created executive boards or departments (such as a Board of War or a Department of Foreign Affairs) to carry out its resolutions, these were still subordinate to the legislature and lacked independent authority. This structural organization, focused entirely on the collective legislative will of the member states, contributed significantly to the central government’s fundamental inability to act with the necessary “energy” because it lacked the formal, independent political capacity to enforce laws directly upon citizens (Hamilton, 2003, 108). In such systems, when legislative sessions recessed, executive functions could only be delegated to a “Committee of the States,” consisting of one delegate from each member state, which exercised limited delegated powers

Federalism: Structured Separation or Fusion of Powers

In contrast, federalism is fundamentally characterized by the allocation of powers among separate branches of government, usually comprising the legislative, executive, and judicial organs. The institutional design of the central government explicitly addresses the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, adopting either a model of structured separation of powers (presidential systems) or fusion of powers (parliamentary systems) (Watts, 2008, 136, 137).

Fusion of Powers (Parliamentary Federalism)

Other federations, such as Switzerland, Canada, and Germany, incorporate parliamentary principles where the executive (Cabinet or Council) is directly accountable to the legislature. For instance, in Switzerland, the Federal Assembly (legislature) elects the Federal Council (executive) and federal courts (judiciary). The Swiss Federal Council, a collegial body of seven equal members, collectively submits new laws to the Parliament, which retains sovereignty over federal finances. Critically, in this system, the executive is inseparable from the legislature in practice, meaning that parliamentary decisions are generally not an expression of confidence or no confidence in the government, and the executive cannot be dissolved by the legislature during its four-year term. This balance contrasts with many other parliamentary systems, yet still illustrates the functional fusion designed for governance.

Similarly, in Nepal, which operates as a federal democratic republic, executive rights are vested in the Council of Ministers/Cabinet, while the Federal Legislature consists of two houses, the House of Representatives and the National Assembly, The relationship between Nepal’s three organs of state (executive, legislature, and judiciary) is structured on the principle of separation of powers. The function of the legislature is to form the government (executive) and provide oversight, as well as enact and amend laws.

The core structural distinction remains: confederalism suffered from a single, dominant, yet institutionally weak legislature attempting to perform executive functions without coercive authority, while federalism mandates separate (or functionally fused) and robust executive and legislative branches that are constitutionally defined and directly accountable to the citizenry (Watts, 2008, 137; Hamilton, 2003, 114).

This model can be applied in northern Syria. If the experiment is successful, it can be generalized so that any region that wishes to join this model of governance can be included.

We will talk a little about the arguments of the extremists in Syria, to impose their tyranny and violence, with statements that contradict the Qur’an, which is the highest religious legislative text for Muslims.

We will take as an example Syria, where extremists currently hold power and promote radical ideology. We will refute their claims using the Quran itself, which contradicts their extremism.

Although Syrian civil law restricts religious legislation to personal status matters only—that is, matters related to marriage, divorce, and inheritance—some tend to politicize religion, imposing extremist rulings based on hadiths, most of which are classified as weak or fabricated, or which stem from the jurisprudence of imams known for their extremist leanings.

These claims, which carry significant weight, but space does not permit a lengthy discussion. Therefore, we will summarize them, relying on evidence from Quranic texts (the primary source of Islamic law) and from the Prophet’s biography, specifically the treaties he concluded with other religious communities. This can be summarized as follows:

• Freedom of choice and the absence of coercion:

There is no compulsion in religion. (There is no compulsion in religion. Righteousness has become distinct from error.) (Al-Baqarah 256). This is a definitive indication of the negation of obligatory belief and the affirmation of free choice based on clear explanation and conviction. Islam prohibits imposing beliefs on individuals, leaving them free to choose, contrary to the approach of some contemporary ideologies, whether religious, political, or intellectual

(And say, “The truth is from your Lord, so whoever wills – let him believe; and whoever wills – let him disbelieve.”) (Al-Kahf 29). This affirms the freedom of opinion regarding religious discourse, while acknowledging the consequences in the Hereafter.

God Almighty also forbade the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) himself from forcing people to embrace the religion, God says: (And if your Lord had willed, all those on earth would have believed. So will you compel the people to become believers?) (Yunus 99). This negates coercion even in the position of prophethood.

This call for freedom from coercion and compulsion was not only applied intellectually but also practically, by not forcing cohabitation when it became impossible. Islam facilitated divorce procedures for spouses when cohabitation became impossible. Divorce is considered a legally permissible way out of a special bond to prevent harm and the impossibility of continuing the relationship (And if they separate, Allah will enrich each of them from His abundance) [An-Nisa’ 4:130]. ​​This does not produce a direct political ruling, but rather establishes the principle of flexibility and the removal of hardship in relationships, whether social or political. Therefore, the principle of divorce can be applied to facilitating the separation of groups that find it difficult to coexist under the rule of a single entity.

It is worth noting that divorce procedures are easy in Islam (the mere utterance of the word “divorce” is sufficient), based on the principle of rejecting coercion and preventing harm. Unlike other religions and doctrines, where the conditions for divorce are complex and difficult, perhaps the adherence of most international legislations to setting complex conditions for the separation of states and regions can be justified by analogy to the complexity of their conditions for divorce, in contrast to the flexibility of Islam.

In addition to the principle of contract and consent:

(O you who have believed, fulfill your contracts) (Al-Ma’idah 1). This establishes the binding nature of contracts based on mutual consent.

(And their affair is [conducted by] consultation among themselves) (Ash-Shura 38). This establishes a collective decision-making process.

There is evidence from the Prophet’s biography, namely the Constitution of Medina, which serves as a multi-faceted contractual model defining the rights and obligations of diverse religious and ethnic groups, with an agreed-upon supreme authority, and stipulating cooperation, mutual defense, and respect for differences.

Any mechanism for dismantling or re-contracting must be governed by the principles of: no harm, no foul, the preservation of life and property, preventing the means to discord, and considering the consequences.

Fighting in Islam has specific rules and regulations. Fighting is mentioned in the Quran in the context of self-defense, defending the oppressed, and spreading justice. For example, God Almighty says: (Fight in the way of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God does not love transgressors.) (Al-Baqarah 2:190), and He also says: (Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged.) (Al-Hajj 22:39). The verb “permission” is in the passive voice because in the Holy Quran, evil is not attributed to God Almighty, but rather is expressed in the passive voice. Fighting is permissible in Islam for specific purposes, such as defending religion, oneself, and the oppressed, and not for aggression. Islam stipulates that fighting must be for the sake of God and in accordance with the rules of Sharia, which prohibit aggression against the innocent or non-combatants. God Almighty says: (Fight those who do not believe in God or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what God and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture – [fight them] until they give the jizyah ……) (At-Tawbah 9:29) The Most High says: (O you who have believed, fight those of the disbelievers who are near to you ….) (At-Tawbah 9:123). The term “disbelievers” here refers to those who do not believe in the existence of God and His holy books, namely the Quran, the Bible, and the Torah.

All these verses that call for fighting (which are concentrated in Surah At-Tawbah, the only surah that does not begin with the Basmala “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful” due to its harshness and lack of mercy) come in the form of “fight,” which carries the meaning of participation, i.e., fighting only those who fight you. It comes in defense of the aggressor and the oppressor, and to exalt the word of God in establishing the truth. It does not come in the form of “kill,” which means command. Fighting usually comes in the context of defending oneself, one’s religion, or one’s land. And there is His saying: (Fighting has been prescribed for you, though it is hateful to you.) (Al-Baqarah 2:216). It refers to armed conflict imposed under certain circumstances.

We will talk a little about the arguments of the extremists in Syria, to impose their tyranny and violence, with arguments that contradict the Qur’an, which is the highest religious legislative text for Muslims.

We will take as an example Syria, where extremists currently hold power and promote radical ideology. We will refute their claims using the Quran itself, which contradicts their extremism.

Although Syrian civil law restricts religious legislation to personal status matters only—that is, matters related to marriage, divorce, and inheritance—some tend to politicize religion, imposing extremist rulings based on hadiths, most of which are classified as weak or fabricated, or which stem from the jurisprudence of imams known for their extremist leanings.

These claims, which carry significant weight, but space does not permit a lengthy discussion. Therefore, we will summarize them, relying on evidence from Quranic texts (the primary source of Islamic law) and from the Prophet’s biography, specifically the treaties he concluded with other religious communities. This can be summarized as follows:

Freedom of choice and the absence of coercion:

There is no compulsion in religion. (There is no compulsion in religion. Righteousness has become distinct from error.) (Al-Baqarah 256). This is a definitive indication of the negation of obligatory belief and the affirmation of free choice based on clear explanation and conviction. Islam prohibits imposing beliefs on individuals, leaving them free to choose, contrary to the approach of some contemporary ideologies, whether religious, political, or intellectual

(And say, “The truth is from your Lord, so whoever wills – let him believe; and whoever wills – let him disbelieve.”) (Al-Kahf 29). This affirms the freedom of opinion regarding religious discourse, while acknowledging the consequences in the Hereafter.

God Almighty also forbade the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) himself from forcing people to embrace the religion, God says: (And if your Lord had willed, all those on earth would have believed. So will you compel the people to become believers?) (Yunus 99). This negates coercion even in the position of prophethood.

This call for freedom from coercion and compulsion was not only applied intellectually but also practically, by not forcing cohabitation when it became impossible. Islam facilitated divorce procedures for spouses when cohabitation became impossible. Divorce is considered a legally permissible way out of a special bond to prevent harm and the impossibility of continuing the relationship (And if they separate, Allah will enrich each of them from His abundance) [An-Nisa’ 4:130]. ​​This does not produce a direct political ruling, but rather establishes the principle of flexibility and the removal of hardship in relationships, whether social or political. Therefore, the principle of divorce can be applied to facilitating the separation of groups that find it difficult to coexist under the rule of a single entity.

It is worth noting that divorce procedures are easy in Islam (the mere utterance of the word “divorce” is sufficient), based on the principle of rejecting coercion and preventing harm. Unlike other religions and doctrines, where the conditions for divorce are complex and difficult, perhaps the adherence of most international legislations to setting complex conditions for the separation of states and regions can be justified by analogy to the complexity of their conditions for divorce, in contrast to the flexibility of Islam.

In addition to the principle of contract and consent:

(O you who have believed, fulfill your contracts) (Al-Ma’idah 1). This establishes the binding nature of contracts based on mutual consent.

(And their affair is [conducted by] consultation among themselves) (Ash-Shura 38). This establishes a collective decision-making process.

There is evidence from the Prophet’s biography, namely the Constitution of Medina, which serves as a multi-faceted contractual model defining the rights and obligations of diverse religious and ethnic groups, with an agreed-upon supreme authority, and stipulating cooperation, mutual defense, and respect for differences.

Any mechanism for dismantling or re-contracting must be governed by the principles of: no harm, no foul, the preservation of life and property, preventing the means to discord, and considering the consequences.

Fighting in Islam has specific rules and regulations. Fighting is mentioned in the Quran in the context of self-defense, defending the oppressed, and spreading justice. For example, God Almighty says: (Fight in the way of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God does not love transgressors.) (Al-Baqarah 2:190), and He also says: (Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged.) (Al-Hajj 22:39). The verb “permission” is in the passive voice because in the Holy Quran, evil is not attributed to God Almighty, but rather is expressed in the passive voice. Fighting is permissible in Islam for specific purposes, such as defending religion, oneself, and the oppressed, and not for aggression. Islam stipulates that fighting must be for the sake of God and in accordance with the rules of Sharia, which prohibit aggression against the innocent or non-combatants. God Almighty says: (Fight those who do not believe in God or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what God and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture – [fight them] until they give the jizyah ……) (At-Tawbah 9:29) The Most High says: (O you who have believed, fight those of the disbelievers who are near to you ….) (At-Tawbah 9:123). The term “disbelievers” here refers to those who do not believe in the existence of God and His holy books, namely the Quran, the Bible, and the Torah.

All these verses that call for fighting (which are concentrated in Surah At-Tawbah, the only surah that does not begin with the Basmala “In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful” due to its harshness and lack of mercy) come in the form of “fight,” which carries the meaning of participation, i.e., fighting only those who fight you. It comes in defense of the aggressor and the oppressor, and to exalt the word of God in establishing the truth. It does not come in the form of “kill,” which means command. Fighting usually comes in the context of defending oneself, one’s religion, or one’s land. And there is His saying: (Fighting has been prescribed for you, though it is hateful to you.) (Al-Baqarah 2:216). It refers to armed conflict imposed under certain circumstances.

Recommendations:

The development of recommendations for an integrated system, synthesizing elements of federalism and confederalism, necessitates the establishment of a robust constitutional and institutional framework that overcomes the structural defects of the latter while mitigating the complexities and rigidity of the former. The resultant hybrid model, often termed “Cooperative Federalism” or a “Flexible Union,” focuses on institutional mechanisms that embed central capacity and stability with mechanisms for regional autonomy, consultation, and managed flexibility.

1. Foundational and Constitutional Aspects
2. Core Structure and Sovereignty

The integrated approach must prioritize constitutional entrenchment over the contractual nature of a confederal treaty, establishing a durable, non-dissolvable political union.

1. Sovereignty and Capacity: The system requires adopting the core federal characteristic of shared constitutional sovereignty, wherein the constitution explicitly grants the central government the power to act directly upon individual citizens (rather than through intermediary states) in areas essential to the union, such as defense, commerce, and taxation. This direct central authority eliminates the “greatest and radical defect” of confederalism—the reliance on voluntary state compliance, which historically led to political “imbecility” and dissolution.
2. Permanence and Secession: The fundamental principle of permanence and indivisibility must be adopted, formally prohibiting the inherent, unilateral right of constituent units to secede (ius secessionis). However, to manage deep internal conflict, the integrated framework should provide a conditional legal path for negotiated withdrawal. This requires that any decision to separate adheres to foundational federal principles, including the rule of law and democracy, transforming the threat of withdrawal from a source of fragility into a managed democratic procedure.

The conditions for separation can be made more flexible (since there is no compulsion in religion, i.e., in any affiliation(this is stated in the Quranic text for Muslims, which calls for freedom of belief, contrary to what extremists promote), and based on the principle of preserving the rights of minorities, and not just respecting the rights of the majority), so that it is taken into account, for example, that if a referendum is held on the people of a unit and the majority agrees to separation, then it is required for it to be achieved by the approval of no less than 51% of the members of the State Legislative Council.

3. Constitutional Flexibility: To prevent the constitutional paralysis observed in rigid federal systems, amendments that impact the distribution of powers must utilize special or dual majority rules (e.g., requiring a majority of the people and a majority of the constituent units). This consensual process replaces the paralyzing unanimity required in confederal arrangements, allowing for timely evolution while protecting regional interests.
4. Legislative and Executive Aspects
5. Legislative Structure (Composite Representation)

The integrated model must utilize a genuine bicameral system to ensure national legislative decisions reflect both the population (the unitary interest) and the regional/territorial interests.

1. Second Chamber (Regional Representation): The upper house (Council of the Federation) must be powerful, designed to reflect the distinct views of the constituent units, preferably composed of representatives chosen to reflect regional factors (e.g., delegates from constituent governments).
2. Implementation Mechanism (Suspensive Veto): The legislative process should incorporate mechanisms that grant the regionally-focused chamber a strong voice without creating political gridlock. The optimal tool is the suspensive veto (or “delaying veto”) on critical legislation (e.g., distribution of powers, fiscal matters). This mechanism forces the lower house (representing the majority of the population) to seriously consider and potentially modify the bill or override the objection with a super-majority, thus ensuring regional input while guaranteeing a decision can ultimately be made.
3. Asymmetric Constitutionalism: To accommodate profound ethnic, linguistic, or historical differences, the constitution should incorporate asymmetric provisions (or large non-constitutional bilateral agreements) that grant certain units special powers or prerogatives. This acknowledges and manages divergence, enhancing political stability and legitimacy.
4. Executive and Administrative Implementation

The integrated system should structure the execution of policies based on decentralized administration, characteristic of Cooperative Federalism.

1. Integrated Federalism Model: The Federal Center asserts its legislative authority by adopting framework legislation that establishes broad national standards. Responsibility for the detailed administration and execution of these federal laws is then devolved to the constituent units. This allows for federal policy coherence while permitting local adaptation to regional circumstances.
2. Intergovernmental Cooperation (IGR): Formal institutional mechanisms for intergovernmental collaboration and consultation (IGC) must be institutionalized, such as specialized inter-executive bodies and regular meetings among heads of government. These bodies facilitate political bargaining and policy coordination, mitigating the chronic coordination problems and friction often associated with purely competitive federalism.

– Recommendations for Guarantees and Implementation

– Political Guarantees: A Culture of Dialogue and Compromise:

Recommendation: Encourage the formation of “transnational” political parties (i.e., parties with a presence at both the central and local levels) rather than purely regional parties. This fosters multi-level loyalties.

 Advantage: Builds a culture of consensus-based politics, where negotiation and compromise become the norm, not confrontation.

– Legal Guarantees: A Strong and Independent Constitutional Court:

Recommendation: Establish a Constitutional Court whose judges are jointly appointed by the President/Central Parliament, and representatives of the constituent units.

Advantage: Serves as a neutral and universally accepted body to adjudicate disputes between the central government and the constituent units, thus preventing recourse to non-peaceful means.

– Principle of Subsidiarity:

Recommendation: Stipulate in the Constitution that “decisions should be made at the lowest level of government capable of effectively addressing them.” That is, authority rests with the constituent unit unless there is a clear need for intervention at the central level.

Advantage: This is the core of the integrative model. It protects the independence of the units from the domination of the center (a rigid federalist approach), and justifies the intervention of the center when the issue is beyond the unit’s capacity (a confederal approach).

This comprehensive design ensures that national capacity and security (federal stability) are achieved while simultaneously guaranteeing the practical involvement and autonomy of decentralized units in policy formulation and execution (confederal flexibility). This structured integration transforms the former sources of confederal weakness into managed federal assets.

This is a “cooperative union.” In it, the central government is strong where it needs to be (defense, monetary policy, minimum standards of rights), the constituent units are independent where they need to be (culture, education, local development), and decisions are made collaboratively and consensually in shared areas. This is equitable integration that respects individuality and builds a shared future.

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• Ter-Minassian, Teresa (Ed.), Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice, 1997, International Monetary Fund, Washington.
• Watts, Ronald L. Comparing Federal Systems, Third Edition, 2008, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal & Kingston.

[1] -The research is being studied by Dr. Safia Zivingi, for a professional master’s certificate in the Department of Management and Applied Economics at the College of Applied Interdisciplinary LTD.