A New Front in Africa: Changing Geography of Lake Chad Traps Millions Between Violence and Floods

Prepared by the researche :  Amr Rashad Ismail – Expert in African Affairs

DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH

Introduction

The transformation of Lake Chad’s geography over recent decades has been far more than an environmental or hydrological phenomenon; it has become a central factor in reshaping the political, security, and social landscape of the Sahel and the lake’s basin. The lake’s surface area has shrunk by more than 90% since the 1960s, the result of a combination of climate change, recurrent droughts, and the over-extraction of water resources through irrigation and dam projects. This has led to a decline in freshwater reserves, increased salinity, and the degradation of the ecosystem that for decades supported fishing, farming, and livestock herding. This profound environmental shift has directly impacted the livelihoods of some 30 million people living in the region, deepening their vulnerability to economic and social pressures, and creating a vacuum for armed groups to exploit the weakness of state authority—turning the lake into a complex arena where environmental crises intersect with armed conflicts.[1]

Against this backdrop, extremist groups—chief among them Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP)—have found a golden opportunity to exploit the worsening living conditions to expand their influence. These organizations have seized control of vital sectors such as fishing, farming, and livestock trading, imposing “taxes” and extortion payments on local populations in exchange for allowing them to pursue their economic activities, in a pattern known as the “violent economy.” They have succeeded in building an integrated resource network that includes smuggling goods, human trafficking, and leveraging cross-border trafficking routes—often aided by the complicity of corrupt elements within security forces. This economic control has become a funding base for their military operations, including the purchase of weapons, the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the financing of attacks on isolated military outposts around the lake—at a time when joint military operations by the concerned states are in decline. [2]

In contrast, the official military presence in the area suffers from structural problems, most notably poor equipment, a shortage of personnel, and the logistical difficulties of operating in a complex geography dotted with islands, swamps, and vast unmonitored expanses. This reality has turned many remote military bases into easy targets for attacks, in what is known as ISWAP’s “camp-burning” campaign—designed to seize weapons and equipment and expand territorial control. These repeated assaults have not only caused battlefield losses but have also undermined troop morale and eroded local populations’ confidence in the state’s ability to protect them. In some cases, communities have entered into informal arrangements with armed groups to guarantee their safety, further entrenching the influence of these groups.[3]

Beyond the security dimension, climate change and environmental crises exacerbate conditions in the Lake Chad Basin. Recent floods and rising water levels in some areas have destroyed vast tracts of farmland, submerged residential zones, and increased rates of internal displacement. As arable and fishable lands diminish, disputes have intensified among farmers, herders, and fishers, in the absence of effective mechanisms for conflict resolution—especially after traditional and religious leaders have been targeted by armed groups. This collapse of traditional social structures has deprived local communities of their historical tools for managing shared resources, weakened their capacity to adapt to climatic and economic pressures, and left them more susceptible to recruitment or exploitation by armed actors.[4]

In this context, the article seeks to answer the central research question: Can the lake’s riparian states, along with their regional and international partners, develop a comprehensive strategy that addresses the root causes of the environmental crisis and curbs the expansion of armed groups? Or will the Lake Chad Basin remain an open arena for violent economies and escalating conflicts, with all the attendant threats to regional stability and human security in the area?

First: The Transformation of Fishing, Farming, and Herding into Sources of Armed Group Financing

For communities surrounding Lake Chad, fishing, farming, and livestock herding have historically been the backbone of their economic strength and the guarantor of their social stability. However, this foundation has undergone a radical transformation with the escalation of armed conflict and the emergence of groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). These groups recognized the strategic value of these vital sectors—not only as sources of food but also as sustainable streams of revenue. They seized control of production areas and trade routes, imposing taxation systems under the guise of zakat or levies on farmers, fishers, and herders. This shift has turned once-livelihood-centered activities into components of a “violent economy,” in which a substantial portion of revenues is funneled into purchasing weapons, supporting fighters, and financing military expansion. This control has been accompanied by the exploitation of state fragility, as collection often occurs in areas with no effective presence of security or administrative authorities, entrenching these groups as a coercive substitute for the state.[5]

Fishing, once the lifeline of the economic system on the islands and shores of the lake, has become a direct target for armed groups. They capitalized on government restrictions on access to fishing zones under the pretext of counterterrorism. The banning of entry to many islands on the grounds that they were operational areas left the field open for militants to dictate terms to fishers, who were forced to operate under their control in exchange for paying fixed fees on each shipment or catch. In some cases, armed groups provided protection to fishers against rival militias or raids, in return for strict adherence to these fees—thereby reinforcing local dependence on them as intermediaries and protectors. Yet, this role effectively kept communities hostage to an economy geared toward serving the war efforts of these groups.[6]

Farming has undergone similar transformations. Armed groups have exploited the displacement of farmers from fertile lands—whether due to flooding or fighting—by taking over these lands and redistributing them under financial terms or in exchange for allegiance. In their zones of control, these groups have imposed post-harvest levies on crops, in some instances raising rates to several times their previous levels—for example, increasing the levy on a single field from 10,000 to 40,000 naira after each harvest season. Such taxation not only places a heavy economic burden on farmers but also limits their capacity to invest in improving production or rehabilitating their lands, thereby increasing their dependence on the groups that control access to markets, water, and fertilizers.[7]

Herding and livestock trade—particularly the prized Kuri cattle for which the region is known—have not been spared from this pattern. Armed groups have recognized the high financial and nutritional value of livestock, imposing levies on herders for the use of traditional grazing areas and confiscating herds from those who resisted or opposed them. They have also used livestock trade as a direct means of financing operations, whether by selling the animals in markets through intermediaries or through cross-border smuggling networks, leveraging their connections with traders in neighboring countries. Given weak border controls and corruption among some security personnel, the movement of livestock from conflict zones to major markets has taken place with relative ease, ensuring a steady cash flow for these groups.[8]

Control over these economic sectors has not been merely opportunistic but rather part of a broader strategy to establish an alternative governance model. Armed groups have gone beyond simple taxation to attempt to institutionalize quasi-local administration—organizing fishing, farming, and herding activities, setting rules for conflict resolution, and at times providing “services” such as securing trade routes or protecting markets from theft. These practices lend them a degree of relative legitimacy in the eyes of some residents who have lost faith in the state’s ability to protect or support them. In reality, however, they integrate the local economy into the machinery of war financing and further isolate communities from state institutions.[9]

This complex reality makes it difficult to separate the economic dimension from the security dimension of the Lake Chad Basin conflict. Fishing, farming, and herding—purely civilian activities—have become embedded within the dynamics of armed conflict, carrying with them flows of revenue and essential resources. The continuation of this pattern reinforces violent economies and prolongs the conflict, as armed groups gain a self-sustaining source of funding that reduces their dependence on external support. This poses a major challenge to any strategy aimed at disarming these groups or undermining their influence. Addressing this phenomenon will therefore require a comprehensive approach that integrates security measures with the rehabilitation of the local economy and the strengthening of community resilience outside systems of violence. [10]

Second: Remote Military Outposts as a Fatal Flaw in Counterterrorism Efforts

Remote military outposts in the Lake Chad Basin represent one of the most significant vulnerabilities in the region’s counterterrorism architecture. Their location in geographically isolated areas—amid islands, swamps, and waterways—makes supply and rescue operations extremely complex. Many of these bases were originally established in villages or zones previously devastated by conflict, with the intent of facilitating stabilization and the resettlement of displaced populations. However, in practice, they have become ideal targets for attacks by the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). The group recognizes that these sites often lack full complement in both manpower and equipment, giving it a clear tactical advantage, particularly in night raids or surprise assaults carried out by well-trained, highly mobile fighter units.[11]

The group has adopted a systematic strategy it calls the “camp burning” doctrine, in which attacks on these remote sites aim to paralyze the security forces’ ability to operate in border and rural areas. Such attacks are typically rapid and executed with concentrated firepower, relying on light but advanced weaponry and the use of modified drones to drop explosives on guard posts and critical infrastructure within the camps. The objective is not merely to kill soldiers or briefly occupy the site, but primarily to seize weapons, ammunition, and equipment. This reduces the group’s dependence on external smuggling networks and grants it a degree of self-sufficiency in armaments.[12]

Weaknesses in reinforcement and support systems exacerbate the problem. Clashes often last for hours without the arrival of any air or ground reinforcements due to the long distances and the difficulty of moving through such complex terrain. Documented incidents, such as attacks on locations like Malam Fatori on the Nigeria–Niger border, have shown that troops sometimes fought alone for three hours before the attackers withdrew, taking weapons and equipment with them. This breakdown in supply lines not only damages morale but also emboldens the group to repeat such operations, confident that the government’s response will be slow and ineffective.[13]

Geography plays a fundamental role in cementing this vulnerability. Lake Chad, with its remote islands and intricate network of waterways, offers militant groups safe havens inaccessible to government forces without advanced naval or amphibious capabilities—assets that most militaries in the region lack. This deficit forces reliance on aerial strikes, but the group has adapted to that threat by constructing underground shelters and fortifications within villages and civilian areas, making it more difficult to target them without causing collateral damage.[14]

The impact of these attacks extends beyond direct battlefield losses to strategic and political dimensions. The repeated targeting and temporary overrunning of remote outposts undermines local populations’ trust in the state’s ability to protect them. It pushes some communities toward cooperation with the group or acceptance of its presence as an unavoidable reality. Furthermore, the loss of heavy equipment and advanced weaponry represents a costly drain on military resources that is difficult to replace, creating a vicious cycle of vulnerability and repeated exposure to attack.

Addressing this flaw requires a comprehensive reassessment of how such outposts are distributed and deployed. Efforts should focus on strengthening rapid mobility and immediate response capabilities—whether through establishing paired bases in close proximity to provide mutual support, or by enhancing naval and amphibious capacity to reach islands and remote areas. Early-warning and communications systems between isolated sites and command centers must also be improved, ensuring that frontline forces are not merely passive targets awaiting their fate, but resilient units capable of holding their ground and repelling attacks until reinforcements arrive. [15]

Fourth: Political and Security Exploitation of the Lake Chad Crisis

The multi-dimensional crisis unfolding in the Lake Chad Basin has turned into a pressure card wielded by both governments and armed groups. Some regional governments leverage the security and counterterrorism agenda in the area as a means to obtain military and financial support from international powers or regional partners. This political instrumentalization of the crisis transforms the Lake Chad issue into a tool for legitimizing the extension of exceptional powers for ruling regimes and for justifying restrictions on public freedoms under the pretext of safeguarding security. In parallel, armed groups successfully exploit ethnic tensions and social grievances stemming from environmental degradation and displacement, converting them into mobilizing narratives against the authorities—deepening divisions and increasing the fragility of local communities.[16]

In this context, security cooperation among the basin states becomes subject to complex political calculations, as bilateral or regional disputes often dictate the nature of joint coordination. For instance, border rivalries or historical conflicts between certain states can slow down the effectiveness of joint military operations, giving armed groups the opportunity to redeploy or expand. Moreover, some states’ reliance on local militias or armed groups loyal to them in managing the conflict opens the door to reproducing unregulated patterns of violence, which reinforce chaos instead of containing it, and undermine trust among supposed partners in the fight against terrorism.[17]

The media and political discourse surrounding Lake Chad has also become part of a broader power game, with governments sometimes amplifying or downplaying the scale of the threat according to their immediate interests. At times, the danger posed by armed groups is exaggerated to attract more international support, while at other times the rhetoric is softened to reassure investors or public opinion. This manipulation of information obstructs the building of a realistic and sustainable regional response, as it obscures the true scale of the crisis and leads to the misallocation of resources—whether in the security or humanitarian domains. [18]

Regional and international actors are by no means absent from this exploitation. Certain major powers view the Lake Chad Basin as a theater for enhancing their military or intelligence presence in Central and West Africa. Interventions conducted under the banners of counterterrorism or humanitarian assistance often carry underlying strategic objectives, such as securing energy resources or expanding spheres of influence. This external presence creates new balances of power but can also exacerbate local tensions—especially when it involves supporting one side at the expense of another—thereby deepening divisions and fueling conflict.[19]

The humanitarian crisis resulting from environmental degradation and armed conflict, instead of serving as an entry point for unifying efforts, has become yet another bargaining chip in political negotiations. Some actors may deliberately slow down or obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid to certain areas as a means of pressuring opponents or punishing communities suspected of supporting armed groups. Such politicization of aid compounds civilian suffering, undermines trust in humanitarian agencies, and feeds into the narratives of armed groups, which exploit this hardship to recruit new members. [20]

In sum, the political and security exploitation of the Lake Chad crisis adds layers of complexity to an already intricate landscape, making any comprehensive solution even more difficult to achieve. Rather than serving as a focal point for regional and international cooperation against shared threats, the lake has become an arena where political ambition intersects with power calculations and security agendas. These dynamics make it imperative to reconsider the mechanisms for addressing the crisis—focusing on tackling the root causes of environmental and social deterioration, and separating humanitarian action from narrow political considerations—to ensure lasting stability in the region. [21]

Fifth: The Resource Race and the Redrawing of Power Maps in the Lake Chad Basin

The Lake Chad Basin is marked by intense competition over scarce natural resources. Decades of declining water levels and environmental degradation have driven local communities, armed groups, and riparian states into a frenzied race to control what remains of fertile lands and water sources. This competition is inseparable from the political and military dimensions of the conflict, as some actors exploit the situation to consolidate their influence at the expense of others, leading to a reshaping of the region’s geopolitical map. Regional and international powers are not absent from the scene; they see the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen their presence by providing military or economic support to certain parties, thereby securing a foothold in a strategic area that links West and Central Africa and controls trade routes and cross-border corridors. [22]

Historically, Lake Chad was a primary source of livelihood for millions of people, but its area has shrunk by approximately 90% since the 1960s. This decline has driven local communities to intensify competition over fishing, farming, and grazing. As these resources dwindle, control over specific sites around the lake has become a matter of survival for communities and a leverage tool for armed groups, which impose levies or restrict access to resources under their own conditions. This situation has created a fertile environment for the merging of economic and security conflicts, with resources serving both as a means of financing violence and as a reason for its continuation—fueling a vicious cycle of conflict and depletion. [23]

The growing internal displacement caused by resource depletion has contributed to reshaping the population map in the region. Armed factions and governments alike have exploited this shift to redistribute influence. For example, one actor might support a displaced community in exchange for political or military loyalty, while other groups may seek to expel rivals from strategic areas to impose exclusive control over land and water. This manipulation of the demographic map deepens ethnic and tribal divisions and entrenches mistrust among different communities, making mediation and long-term peacebuilding efforts increasingly difficult.

Regional actors’ involvement in the Lake Chad resource race carries clear strategic dimensions. These powers recognize that controlling water and land corridors means controlling the movement of goods, weapons, and people across borders. Some seek to strengthen their role as mediators or guarantors of stability, while others prefer to indirectly fuel conflicts to ensure the persistence of their influence through mutual dependency with local forces. Such geopolitical calculations render any resource-sharing agreements fragile and prone to collapse should power balances shift or the priorities of intervening parties change. [24]

The economic factor plays a central role in this race, as the interests of local actors intersect with those of foreign investors seeking to exploit the region’s remaining agricultural and water potential. While such investments may promise development, they often spark controversy due to being carried out in a conflict-prone and unstable environment, leaving their returns vulnerable to extortion or confiscation. Rather than improving the conditions of local communities, these ventures sometimes become yet another source of conflict—particularly if not accompanied by fair mechanisms for revenue distribution or safeguards for local rights.[25]

In this complex context, the resource race in the Lake Chad Basin goes beyond a struggle for survival, becoming part of a broader process of redrawing local and regional power maps. The interweaving of environmental, economic, political, and military factors makes it nearly impossible to address one dimension in isolation from the others and poses serious challenges to any settlement or sustainable development efforts. The fundamental question that arises from this reality is whether resource management can be transformed into a tool for regional cooperation and peacebuilding, or whether the basin will remain hostage to unending conflicts over its dwindling natural wealth. [26]

In conclusion, the Lake Chad Basin stands as a stark example of the interwoven nature of environmental crises with security and political dynamics at the heart of Africa. Climate change and the loss of resources do not occur in isolation; rather, they interact with weak state institutions, competition among local and regional powers, and the rise of armed groups to produce a complex and constantly evolving conflict environment. This environment not only redraws maps of power on the ground but also reshapes social and economic relations in the region, imposing compounded challenges on efforts toward development and stability. Any effective response must be multi-layered, linking sustainable resource management, the strengthening of local governance capacities, and the enhancement of regional security cooperation. Without such an approach, the basin will remain hostage to conflicts with no foreseeable end.

In light of this analysis, the answer to the question posed at the beginning of the article leans toward the necessity of formulating a comprehensive and integrated strategy—one that addresses the environmental and social roots of the crisis in parallel with reducing the ability of armed groups to finance and expand their operations. The success of such a strategy depends on the riparian states’ commitment to overcoming their disputes, building effective mechanisms for regional cooperation, and securing sustained international support that focuses on capacity-building rather than temporary fixes. Otherwise, the economies of violence will remain deeply entrenched, and the conflicts will continue to reproduce themselves at an accelerating pace.

[1] M Samuel, Islamic State fortifies its positions in the Lake Chad Basin, Institute for Security Studies, 13 July 2021, https://issafrica.org/isstoday/islamic-state-fortifies-its-position-in-thelake-chad-basin .

[2]C Speranza, U Wiesmann and S Rist, An indicator framework for assessing livelihood resilience in the context of social-ecological dynamics, Global Environmental Change, 2014.

[3] M Samuel, Boko Haram and COVID-19: Lake Chad Basin’s war on two fronts, Institute for Security Studies, 2021, https://issafrica.org/isstoday/boko-haram-and-covid-19-lake-chad-basinswar-on-two-fronts.

[4] Institute for Security Studies (ISS), “Lake Chad Basin socio-economic resilience in the shadow of Boko Haram,” West Africa Report, ISS, link: https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/lake-chad-basin-socio-economic-resilience-in-the-shadow-of-boko-haram

[5] VOA Afrique, La culture du poivron de nouveau autorisée au Niger malgré Boko Haram, 18 October 2017, https://www.voaafrique.com/a/laculture-du-poivrondenouveauautoriseeaunigermalgrebokoharam/4075695.html#:~:text=Les%20autorit%C3%A9s%20de%20Diffa%20avaient,pour%20%22financer%20ses%20activit%C3%A9s%22.

[6] Institute for Security Studies (ISS), “Boko Haram’s deadly business: An economy of violence in the Lake Chad Basin,” West Africa Report, ISS, link: https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/boko-harams-deadly-business-an-economy-of-violence-in-the-lake-chad-basin

[7] UNOCHA, Tchad Rapport de situation, 10 September 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/chad/tchad-rapport-de-situation-10-sept-2020.

[8] Institute for the Study of War (ISW), “Africa File: JNIM Seizes Burkinabe Provincial Capital…,” ISW—Africa File, link: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-may-15-2025-jnim-seizes-burkinabe-provincial-capital-latest-blow-traor%C3%A9

[9] France24, Nigeria: des dizaines de paysans tués par des activists islamistes présumés, 30 November 2020, https://www.france24.com/fr/

[10] Célestin Delanga & Abélégué Alliance Fidèle, “Lake Chad Basin governments should redouble efforts against ISWAP,” ISS Today, link: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lake-chad-basingovernments-should-redouble-efforts-against-iswap

[11] Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, “Violent extremism erodes local climate resilience in the Sahel,” ISS Today, link: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/violent-extremism-erodes-local-climate-resilience-inthe-sahel

[12] The Cable Nigeria, “Zulum: Army lacks necessary equipment to battle tech-savvy terrorists,” The Cable, link: https://www.thecable.ng/zulum-army-lacks-necessary-equipment-to-battle-tech-savvy-terrorists/

[13] International Crisis Group, Le Sahel central, théâtre des nouvelles guerres climatiques, Crisis Group, link: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/b154-le-sahel-central-theatre-desnouvelles-guerres-climatiques

[14] Institute for Security Studies (ISS), “Lake Chad Basin’s military bases in ISWAP’s cross-hairs,” ISS Today, link: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lake-chad-basin-s-military-bases-in-iswap-s-crosshairs

[15] Refugees International, “Climate-fueled Violence and Displacement in the Lake Chad Basin: Focus on Chad and Cameroon,” Refugees International, link: https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/climate-fueled-violence-anddisplacement-in-the-lake-chad-basin-focus-on-chad-and-cameroon

[16] Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, From Crisis to Conflict: Climate Change and Violent Extremism in the Sahel, Institute.global, link: https://institute.global/insights/geopolitics-andsecurity/from-crisis-to-conflict-climate-change-and-violent-extremism-in-the-sahel

[17] International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), Unravelling the Niger coup and its implications for violent extremism in the Sahel, ICCT, link: https://icct.nl/publication/unravelling-niger-coup-and-its-implications-violent-extremism-sahel

[18] United Nations, Activities of the United Nations system in implementing United Nations… (thematic report), OHCHR, link: https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/a77718activities-united-nations-system-implementing-united-nations

[19] Open Docs IDS (by S Herbert), Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Conflict … (IDS download), IDS, link: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/ndownloader/files/53147225

[20] SIPRI, Sahel–sud du Sahara: Tendances et conflits climatiques (French fact sheet), SIPRI, link: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2023-10/21_fs_sahel_french.pdf

[21] ACLED, “Conflict intensifies and instability spreads beyond Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger,” ACLED, link: https://acleddata.com/report/conflict-intensifies-and-instability-spreads-beyond-burkinafaso-mali-and-niger

[22] Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Counterterrorism shortcomings in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger,” FPRI, link: https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/counterterrorism-shortcomings-in-maliburkina-faso-and-niger/

[23] Institute for Security Studies (ISS), “Risks of Burkina Faso’s new military approach to terrorism,” ISS Today, link: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/risks-of-burkina-fasos-new-military-approach-toterrorism

[24] Institute for Security Studies (ISS), “Links between violent extremism and illicit activities in Côte d’Ivoire,” West Africa Report, ISS, link: https://issafrica.org/research/west-africa-report/linksbetween-violent-extremism-and-illicit-activities-in-cote-divoire

[25] Institute for Security Studies (ISS), “Does climate change fuel terrorism in the Sahel,” ISS Today, link: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/does-climate-change-fuel-terrorism-in-the-sahel

[26] Institute for Security Studies (ISS), “Why a jihadist takeover of a Sahelian capital is unlikely,” ISS Today, link: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-a-jihadist-takeover-of-a-sahelian-capital-isunlikely