Prepared by the researche : Amr Rashad Ismail – Expert in African Affairs
DAC Democratic Arabic Center GmbH
The ousting of President Assad in Syria is likely to have far-reaching consequences for Russia, a once-close ally, and these repercussions may extend to its activities and operations in Africa. For decades, Syria served as a key logistical hub for Moscow, hosting military bases and support facilities crucial for Russia’s overseas operations. With Assad now in exile in Russia, the Kremlin must confront the implications for its African endeavors.
Gold, Diamonds, and Precious Timber Trade
Africa holds significant importance for Russia’s long-term strategy for several reasons. Reports indicate that Moscow earns nearly $1 billion annually from its operations in the Central African Republic alone, which include the illicit trade of gold, diamonds, and precious timber. Additionally, Russia’s management of oil fields in Libya and Sudan serves as a major source of foreign currency, helping Moscow evade Western sanctions. Russia also has political interests in the continent, as many African nations were reluctant to condemn its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with some even supporting the claim that Russia is leading a battle against Western dominance.
Amid the Russia-Ukraine war, Africa (alongside Central Asia) has become a key source of labor for Russia, which faces a growing shortage of workers, particularly in manufacturing and services. African migrant workers have been employed in Russian drone and ammunition factories, which are crucial to Moscow’s war efforts.
Finally, the Sahel and Central Africa have become centers from which Russia can threaten NATO’s southern flank by sparking another wave of migration to Southern Europe, potentially sowing discord among EU members. Russian military forces and missiles stationed in Libya also provide Moscow with significant leverage in future negotiations with European governments.
The Strategic Hmeimim Air Base
The future of Moscow’s presence in Africa is under threat due to the uncertain future of its partnership with Syria. The Russian naval base in Tartus, which Hafez al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s father, agreed to lease to Moscow in 1971, is Russia’s only Mediterranean port and has become one of its most important facilities for overseas operations. In 2017, Moscow extended its lease on the base for 49 years, largely due to its critical role in supporting the Assad regime since 2015. Russia and its mercenary groups also use the Hmeimim Air Base in Latakia as a launchpad for operations in Africa.
Without access to the Hmeimim Air Base, Libya would become Russia’s only ally in Africa accessible by air without refueling, and even that would be challenging, as it requires flying directly over Turkish airspace. These two bases provide logistical support for supplying weapons, ammunition, and equipment for Russian overseas operations, as well as hosting visits by Russian officials. They also serve as hubs for exporting minerals and oil from Africa.
Moreover, Russia’s failure to protect Assad may lead many African governments to question the value of their relationship with Moscow. Russia has developed close ties with several African nations, including Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Libya. Russian officials and former members of the Wagner Group have established personal connections with regional leaders to strengthen these relationships, often gaining access to minerals or other resources in return.
A key guarantee for maintaining this network was Moscow’s ability to offer protection to leaders who had fallen out of favor with the West. However, the Kremlin’s inability to prevent Assad’s ouster may lead governments across the continent to doubt this assumption and erode their trust in Moscow. Military-led regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are now questioning whether Russia can truly assist them if their power is similarly tested, especially given the potential loss of Syrian bases.
Negotiations with Moscow Over Tartus Port
The Kremlin must now consider the best way forward. Reports suggest that Russian officials have held talks with rebel groups that led the Syrian uprising regarding continued access to the Tartus port. Opposition leaders have stated that any agreements signed during Assad’s rule will not be renegotiated for now, and their fate will be left to the Syrian people. The head of the Syrian Liberation Front, which led the uprising, has not publicly commented on the matter. However, given that Moscow’s support was crucial in keeping Assad in power for so long and that Russia continues to provide safe haven for rebels, both the Assad family and opposition groups are likely skeptical of Russian peace initiatives.
Additionally, the Syrian Liberation Front enjoys significant support from Turkey, which has a vested interest in denying Russia access to military or logistical resources in Syria. According to some sources, Russian cargo ships and Antonov An-124 transport planes have visited bases in Tartus and Latakia, possibly to withdraw equipment.
Exploring Alternatives in Africa
Russia is likely to explore other alternatives in Africa to manage its overseas projects. It has long sought a base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. In 2017, the two countries signed an agreement to establish a Russian base there. Reports suggest that the Sudanese port has been used for limited Russian operations, including refueling and resupplying Russian mercenaries operating in Mali and supporting the Sudanese military, even before Assad’s fall. However, distance poses a challenge for Moscow, as it cannot directly transport supplies to Sudan from Russian territory. Maintaining a permanent base in Sudan could become complicated, especially given the ongoing 20-month war in Sudan, which also threatens the security of Russian military facilities in the country.
Libya’s Importance to Moscow
Russia’s most developed network in Africa is in Libya. Throughout 2024, Moscow has been expanding its military presence there, renovating its airbase entrances to allow Il-76 cargo planes to land in the country. In exchange for infrastructure improvements, Russia has secured permanent docking rights at the port of Tobruk, although the port facilities are in poor condition and cannot be used long-term without cooperation with Libyan National Army commander Khalifa Haftar, who controls eastern and southern Libya. Moscow has maintained relations with Haftar for some time, but further investment may be futile if he is forced out of the areas he currently controls.
In Algeria, Russia has expressed interest in building a port that could serve as a base for operations on the continent. Given Algeria’s frustration with the EU’s stance on the Western Sahara conflict and its criticism of the Algerian president, now may be an opportune time to initiate talks. However, Algeria is unlikely to risk its remaining Western partnerships by hosting a Russian base.
In West Africa, Gulf of Guinea countries could also provide Russia with a base for its operations in the Sahel, although the facilities there are unlikely to function as comprehensive logistical hubs. Countries like Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Ghana are within the Kremlin’s sights, but the United States is increasingly working to limit Russian influence in the region.
Ankara’s Growing Competition with Moscow
With limited options, Europe and the United States see an opportunity to reduce Russia’s influence abroad. The U.S. and EU are likely to engage in talks with the new Syrian government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, accepting Russian proposals only as a means to gain leverage in future negotiations with the West. Meanwhile, Turkey, which holds greater influence over the new Syrian government than any other country, may exploit this situation to curb Russian intervention in the Middle East and Africa, where Ankara is increasingly competing directly with Moscow.
The assumption that Russia failed or was unwilling to assist Assad as the rebels advanced is indicative of the pressure the Kremlin faces due to the war in Ukraine. This is also likely to affect Moscow’s plans in Africa, which may be limited to low-cost efforts such as disinformation campaigns, propaganda, and minimal troop deployments. In recent weeks, both Chad and Senegal have ended their military cooperation with France, but neither has indicated that it will replace the French presence with Russian forces.
Recalibrating Russia’s Strategy in Africa
Assad’s removal from power in Syria may mark the end of the decades-long partnership between Moscow and Damascus. The United States and the European Union will likely see Russia’s weakened position in the region as an opportunity to undermine its ability to exert influence elsewhere. Turkey will also seize this chance to ensure Russia cannot regain a foothold in Syria, given its close ties with the Syrian Liberation Front. Consequently, Russia will need to reassess how these developments impact its strategy in Africa.
In conclusion, the sudden ousting of former President Bashar al-Assad and the collapse of his regime represent a major upheaval in the Middle East. Over 2,000 kilometers away, the Kremlin faces a significant challenge due to this rapid downfall of the Syrian regime. The question now is how this will affect Russia’s African Legion, which provides military support to several countries in the Sahel region. Russia’s position in the Middle East is suddenly at risk, and Moscow may lose its military bases in Syria.
